Copyright also misses many of the other issues, in particular the more human elements.

Various dichotomies and classifications, such as that of print versus broadcast media, etc., will not survive in a transmedia world where information can fluidly flow across these different media, and where even the very definition of terms like "broadcast" and "public performance" are becoming harder and harder to fix. For example, is a WWW page a broadcast, a publication, or a performance?

digital age: issue is not discretization (whether ones and zeros or, binary, trinary, or other representations such as residue arithmetic, or continuous voltages, neural networks, or the like... being digital is not the issue, it's more about "being connected", and the human element of what that means. To humans, the difference as to whether something is analog or digital, or whether something is encoded as zeros and ones (binary), or encoded as zeros, ones, and twos (trinary), or as infinitely many states (infinary) such as continuously varying time intervals between pulses (e.g. as in an artifical global electronic neural network, linking the entire globe with analog circuits),

define more broadly "covernment" (computers, corporatized, etc., gov't) In the computational age...


We cannot separate these two, on single creations. For example, the creation of a vote raises both the issue of subject verifiability (of anonymity) and subject ownership (of the informatic link between the vote cast, and the subject identity). Both these rights overlap on certain subject matter, so ... requires both

Increased draconian protection of copyright may create much worse violation of subjectright, for example, payment of royalty every time a work is read, "date expiry", etc. ("big brother inside", computer owners not control own computers).

personhood ... aaaaa

first monday: in particular, "intellectual property." Given the sorry state of that field - which is dominated by massive corporate efforts to extend proprietary claims indefinitely, to severely penalize infractions against those claims, and to weaken "consumer" protection by transforming commodities purchases into revocable and heavily qualified use-licenses - it's fair to ask whether it's wise to conform such an allegedly important system as DNS to that morass.

Andrew Christie, a Panelist with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva, advocates in "Reconceptualising Copyright in the Digital Era", copyright reform instead of dismissal or replacement: having a smaller number of broader catagories, rather than making another catagory for online media. Christie proposes narrowing copyright to two broad catagories: performance and fixation. The notion of "fixation" arises, for example, in the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, (making copyright applicable from the moment of creation, rather than the moment of publication). This Act accounted for new media of data storage and retrieval, extending copyright to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed" (Title 17, 102).

However, this dichotomy between performance and fixation still presents problems, e.g. issues such as the publication of students' lecture notes on the Internet. It is often argued that a lecture is a performance. However, it may also be argued that a lecture is a fixation: Mathieu Deflem claims there should be copyright protection of lectures because content at least partially "fixed":

"[L]ectures in educational settings, especially those conducted by qualified instructors at accredited institutes of higher learning, are never oral expressions as such but are always prepared and delivered in a very specific form with various accompanying materials, such as written notes from which teachers lecture orally, images and sound recordings that accompany the lecture, maps and lesson plans, and textbooks and other scholarly writings on which lectures are based".
Mathieu Deflem 1999: "Teaching Laws: The Legal Protection of Education and Its Relevance for Online Notes Companies", 2000 Feb. 8,

Moreover, the very definition of "fixation":

work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission" (Title 17, 102)
may be called into question. For example, what if the material being transmitted is buffered on a local hard drive before broadcast, and what about caches? Since there is a hierarchy of caches ranging from SRAM, to DRAM, to hard drives, to the Internet itself, it is very difficult, in modern computer architecture, to define exactly what is meant by "fixation".

While federal copyright law protects "fixed" works, "[u]nfixed works... are left to whatever protection state law may accord" Melville and Perlman (1998), p. 364.

This obesession with the differentiation between fixed and unfixed works will likely need to disappear.

Barlow, "The Economy of Ideas: Selling Wine Without Bottles", Wired, March 1994.



Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis (1890), describe privacy as rights, irrespective of whether fixed (published) or unfixed, providing for "each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others... The existence of this right does not depend upon the particular method of expression" (pp. 198-199).